

~~COMMUNICATE~~

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BiPac

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NRO Review Completed

Dear Fritz:

I'm sitting here ~~and~~ quietly trying to ^{distill} out the best possible suggestions, advice, and ideas that I can ^{muster} to help you make (what is becoming increasingly evident, ^{will be}) a large number of presentations on SAMOS.

Of course, ^{this is} SAMOS-post U-2 and this alone poses unique problems ^{and opportunities}.

In my own thinking ^{about briefings} I have found it ^{always} mandatory ^{and} important to consider the audience. Your audience from here on in is going to be composed of groups who are pretty worried who ~~know~~ now see SAMOS standing as perhaps the last best hope, who have come to depend on SAMOS, and who now want to be assured and reassured that the program is sound though imaginative, urgent though well organized, and that ^{it} is proceeding with haste ^{all deliberate} ~~although deliberately~~.

Your job will be to avoid falling in the trap of saying ^{either} that the program needs tremendous revision ^{because} if this were the case, what have you been doing up till now) ^{or} on the other hand, ~~saying anything~~ ^{and very few} ~~and saying that~~ nothing can be done ^(because there is no situation for which this statement is true) relevant. X

Again, ^I ~~if I~~ were sitting in any one of your potential audiences from the Air Council on up, I would like to hear you say that you appreciate the novel, in fact, unique situation ^{that} which this program and this nation now finds itself in, and ~~as~~ you are taking an extremely hardnosed look at the entire program. I would like to hear that you have set up a team within the major contractors whose job will be to avoid writing reports, avoid making fancy ^{Booth} ~~presentations~~ and playing that con game, and whose main job will be ~~to be nasty bastards~~ looking intensely at what they themselves are doing elsewhere in the company. ^{that} This group ^{must} ~~will~~ operate on the criteria that first it is important to make the whole system work and then one can afford the luxury of improvements. I would like to hear

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that intense preparations are made to get something upon which better results can be built and derived. I would like to hear you describe a philosophy similar to that I used in B-166 (the paper I gave Colonel King).

Now this is all general as hell. What would I like to hear you say specifically? ^{What} I think ~~that~~ I would like to hear you say that you are considering the present existing program only as the base structure upon which our ideas can be viewed ^{Bevaluated} hopefully with profit. For example, without abandoning anything now doing, I would like to hear you say that you are looking ^{seriously} ~~strong~~ at full television systems similar to ~~TIROS~~ TIROS, that without abandoning the current attempts to recover ⁱⁿ the DISCOVERER program, you are making a serious and new study of the entire system of recovery looking ~~hard~~ with ~~hard eyes~~ at every ^{evaluating new suggestions or trying new methods} single feature thereof. And with respect to the current programmed E Systems you are looking hard at ways to simplify them and get them spaceborne at an early date, etc., etc., etc. ^{could} This then becomes the basis for your immediate, essentially crash efforts to vitalize and pin down all the loose ends of the current program. ^{you} I am sure that if and only if ^{you} serve up an appetizer with respect to the current program or with respect to what you are going to do immediately, ^{we} ~~we~~ will be able to prepare a more leisurely dish of items for the interim future, say three or four years off. Everybody's interested in what you are going to do three or four years from now but if and only if they are reasonably assured that something else is going to happen sooner. In this ^{next} period one can begin to think and plan for other sensors - radar, IR, perhaps for tricky and sophisticated bandwidth compression systems for really sophisticated ferret systems which ^{might be} ~~are~~ useful for technical intelligence, etc. ~~By the way~~

By the way what must precede all ^{of this} discussion is a clear coherent statement of intelligence requirements ^{as they} ~~that~~ are likely to evolve in this decade of the 60's. As I indicated in our meetings, you are simply not going to get these requirements from current operational organizations who are still busy solving. Approved For Release 2009/10/26 : CIA-RDP89B00708R000500140020-8 s, and



not even dreaming of tomorrow's problems. The more sensible and rational pitch in this area seems to me to lie in the direction of emphasizing ^{the increasing importance of} technical intelligence requirements. ^{Targeting} ~~Targeting~~ is important if you want to have a war. Technical intelligence is important if you want to keep the peace. This all above and beyond a whole host of arguments we could get in to on targeting, its role, and whether we are talking about a first strike or second strike, etc., but I'm sure you would not want me to go into these things at this point.

As you will hear from Charlie Heffern who is scheduled to deliver you this (hopefully useful) letter, we have activated a substantial group at RAND from whom I hope something good for the program, and hence for all of us, will result. I hope to call you from Washington for a chat later this week.

Sincerely,

